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 Abstract 
 
An important process of decentralization has been taking place in Spain in the last 
few decades. This has created at least three levels of government: central, regional 
and local. Recent data on elections show that national parties have lost the voting 
race at local elections. On the other hand, at the same time as the economic boom 
in this country in the 2000s, there was also a boom in political corruption at the 
local level. Using an own-elaborated database, including municipal data from 
2003-2011 in Spain, we try to evaluate whether national parties lose votes at 
national elections due to the wrongdoing of their local candidates. Moreover, we 
focus on partisan effects, split analysis in two main political parties in Spain. Our 
analyses yield two main conclusions: the impact is somewhat reduced, but the sign 
of results also depends on whether the corruption is on the right wing or the left 
wing. 
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HOW  WO RRIE D S HO UL D N ATION AL  PAR TIES BE  ABO UT LO CAL CO R R UPTION?1 
 
 
Juan Luis Jiménez2 Carmen García3 Christopher Méndez4 
Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria 
1. Introduction 
One of the main functions of elections is to punish corrupt politicians, i.e. those 
who misuse the entrusted power for private benefit.5 Thus, voting calls are unique 
opportunities to show general discontent and, consequently, to reduce the share of 
those who are corrupt in the government. 
However the negative effect on voting shows some sensitivity as there are at least 
two trade-offs at the polling moment: firstly, as stated by Barberá (2010), when 
citizens decide whom to vote for, they weigh up not only the candidates´ individual 
skills but also the party in which they are running for election. Secondly, citizens 
can be inconsistent in their voting patterns in different elections, i.e. they can split 
their votes among different parties at different levels of election (local, regional, 
national, etc.). 
Since 1978, Spain has progressively become a quasi-federal state (not at the level 
of Germany), starting an important process of decentralization. This process has 
not only affected regional competences in different public services (education, 
                                                 
1 The authors acknowledge comments and suggestions by Joaquín Artés, Yolanda Pérez and an anonymous 
referee. However, all errors are ours. 
2 Contact author: Departamento de Análisis Económico Aplicado. Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran 
Canaria. Facultad de Economía, Empresa y Turismo. Despacho D. 2-12. Campus de Tafira. 35017. Las 
Palmas. E-mail: jljimenez@daea.ulpgc.es; tel: +34 928 458 191. 
3 Email: carmen.garcia121@alu.ulpgc.es 
4 Email: christopher.mendez101@alu.ulpgc.es 
5 See Pellegrini (2011) for an extensive discussion of what corruption means. 
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public health, etc.), but has also introduced a new increasing share (and role) for 
local and regional governments in budgetary concerns.6 
In the last few years, and simultaneously with this decentralization process, a 
boom in corruption has matched the economic boom in Spain, most extensively at 
the local level. Papers by Fernández-Vázquez and Rivero (2010), Costas-Pérez et al 
(2012) and Jiménez and García (2012) have recently analysed this, focusing, 
broadly, on the effects of local corruption on the local vote share of a party with 
corrupt elements in the municipality. 
Although Barberá (2010) considers that ideological closeness is lower at local 
level, does local corruption reduce the importance of national parties in the local 
arena? Considering previous facts mentioned, how relevant is the trade-off 
between ideological proximity (and political loyalty) and illegal activities by local 
candidates in explaining national voting decisions, considering whether local 
corruption is on the right wing or the left wing? 
To address this question, we use a Spanish municipality database that includes 
local indicators, polling results on local and national elections and data on local 
corruption cases, to test whether such local cases affected voting for national 
parties in the period 1999-2011. After this introduction, section 2 briefly discusses 
the related literature on this topic. The details of the database and characteristics 
of Spanish local corruption are discussed in section 3. Section 4 includes the results 
and discussion of the findings. Finally, we draw conclusions in section 5. 
2. Literature review 
The seminal paper by Downs (1957) shows that voters are assumed to cast their 
support for the party they feel closest to them, i.e. they select the party that best 
represents them. However, as we have mentioned, citizens are not always 
consistent in their voting decisions, splitting votes among different parties in 
                                                 
6 Nowadays it exists four levels of Government: Central, Regional, Provincial and Local one. Each level has 
some competences on public expenditures and revenues. For example, while central tax revenue reached 
94.7% of total public revenue in 1978 (local tax revenue was 5.3%), the percentage of distribution in 2010 
was 72.6%, 18.2% and 9.1% for central, regional and local levels respectively. Source: OECD Fiscal 
decentralization database. 
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different levels of poll7; moreover, they usually differentiate between parties and 
candidates. 
However there is a scarcity of literature (as far as we know) on the “vertical 
relationship” among voters, parties and different levels of poll. Enos and 
Lauderdale (2011) investigated how local elections influence the primary 
campaign that takes place within each party. They focus on Obama vs. Rush 
primary campaign, taking into account variables such as race and rate of voting by 
race. The results show that people of a particular race do not vote along racial lines 
the same regardless of where they live; rather, there are local variations so that 
American voters vote according to the place in which they choose to live. 
Capó’s (2011) dissertation on the Spanish case is also worth noting. This study 
shows that independent parties have a greater share of votes in less inhabited 
municipalities. This support for independent parties becomes weaker in 
municipalities with higher population levels. Thereby, it is possible to conclude 
that there is an important relation between the results of national elections and 
those obtained in the most populated municipalities. 
Barberá (2010) used post-electoral survey data in Spain to test whether citizens in 
simultaneous voting show a trade-off between personal representation and the 
role of the parties. He concludes that candidate evaluations are a better predictor 
in local elections than in regional elections, especially in smaller municipalities. 
Ideological closeness, on the other hand, explains variations in voter choice more 
significantly at the regional level than at the local level. Moreover, Dimock and 
Jacobson (1995) or Anduiza et al (forthcoming) for the Spanish case, show that 
partisans are more likely to be tolerant with the corruption cases that affect their 
own party. 
Another field of research is that relating corruption and electoral outcomes. 
Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) examined, using a cross-sectional database, 
whether electoral rules and constitutional structures could influence the level of 
political corruption. Their findings support the idea that proportional 
                                                 
7 See Sanz (2008) for an exposition on the three families of relevant explanations for split-ticket voting. 
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representation systems are more susceptible to corrupt political rent-seeking than 
plurality systems. 
Reed (1999), using data from Japan, reached the conclusion that the loss of votes 
affects not only the corrupt candidate but also the entire party to which he belongs. 
Besides, the severity of the punishment attenuates over time (the loss of votes is 
greater in earlier elections). Nevertheless, he concludes that this effect should not 
be attached to the change in the mind-sets of the voters but to the greater set of 
choices available. 
Due to the boom in local corruption in Spain in the 2000s, a new empirical 
research field has opened up. In fact there are at least three main papers in relation 
to this. The first is that of Fernández-Vázquez and Rivero (2010). They evaluated 
the effect of corruption cases on local election results in Andalucía (the most 
populous Autonomous Community in Spain) in the period 2003-2007. Their 
results support the idea that a party accused of corruption may, in fact, fare better 
than an honest one, provided that the incumbent mayor is removed from office and 
a new candidate is chosen.  
Costas-Pérez et al (2012) used data on local corruption in Spain to evaluate the 
effect on electoral outcomes. These authors used data provided by a Spanish think-
tank and they focused on the number of news items reporting on political scandals 
in which the perpetrators had not necessarily been formally accused. They 
employed a voters’ equation using data from two local elections in the period 
1999-2007. Their analyses showed that the average vote loss after a corruption 
scandal was approximately 4%, although the punishment is greater in cases 
receiving widespread attention by newspapers (up to 9%). The combination of the 
two - scandals with charges and wide press coverage - causes the highest vote loss 
(14%). 
Finally, Jiménez and García (2012) expand the analysis of local corruption cases to 
the period 2000-2011, including not only local cases but also regional ones; 
however, they only consider accused candidates, not scandals as in Costas-Pérez et 
al (2012). In their paper, the authors explore the effects of local corruption in two 
related ways. The first is whether corruption cases undermine the voters´ 
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confidence in political representation. Their estimations show that following 
imputation in a local corruption case, voting abstention increases by an average of 
1.8 percentage points. The second is how the local corruption case affected the 
voting results of those accused. Their analyses confirm that the voters’ attitude 
towards corruption is significantly different with respect to parties on the right or 
the left. The latter’s vote share decreased by approximately 2 percentage points, 
while the former’s share increased by approximately 3 points. Barberá et al (2012) 
try to explain why voters do not punish local corruption: they may be getting direct 
benefits of such illegal activities. 
Nevertheless, the academic literature has not addressed the relationship between 
illegal activities in politics at the local level and results of the same party at the 
national level. This is what we focus on in the following sections. 
3. Database 
In our database, we collected data from the elections that have taken place in Spain 
over the last fifteen years. We have the results of general elections, which are 
generally held every four years, although the last ones were put forward to 2011. 
The previous elections, took place in 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008, following the 
four-year pattern. The local elections are held on the same day in every Spanish 
municipality, a year before the general elections. So, in Spain, the local elections we 
have registered in our database were held in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011. 
A quick look at the results for right-wing and left-wing parties, not only in local 
elections but also general elections, reveals some similarities. In the former, the 
two-party system increased its share from 1987 to 2007, when PSOE (the main 
left-wing party) and PP (the main right-wing party) together attained 70.5% of the 
votes. In the general elections, after a drop from 1982 to 1989, the sum of the 
results of both parties also increased from 1989 to 2008, achieving 81.9% of the 
votes. However, in 2011 the two-party system lost some power in both general and 
local elections, the percentages being 73.2% and 63.1% respectively. 
This shows a clear decrease with respect to the previous elections. Although the 
power of the two-party system only increased by 1% from 2000 to 2004, the 
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variation in the percentage of votes obtained by each party is remarkable. PP lost 
5.5 percentage points; meanwhile PSOE gained 6.7 percentage points. Similarly, 
but in the opposite direction, PP increased its vote share by 5.3 percentage points 
and PSOE lost 14 percentage points. 
Looking at the data from another point of view, if we compare the results in 
national polls with those immediately preceding them regionally, the two main 
national parties did not win the race at the regional level, i.e. they were vote losers 
in the regional calls (despite previous results). This descriptive outcome supports 
the idea of split-ticket voting patterns between certain electoral options as 
described by Sanz (2008).8  
Table 1 illustrates the average vote share in both national and regional elections. 
Although the average vote shares vary from one party and electoral year to 
another, the lowest average share in national elections is always higher than the 
highest share in regional elections. From 2000 to 2011, the main right-wing party 
(PP) had a 39.9 average share in the national polls, while it was 30.9 in the regional 
arena. In the case of the main left-wing party (PSOE), those averages were 38.0 and 
33.4 respectively. These indicate the importance of local elections for national 
parties: it is a territory to conquer. 
Table 1 Average vote share by election (national and regional) 
 PP PSOE 
2000 (national poll) 42.1 (15.9) 35.5 (13.3) 
2003 (regional poll) 30.0 (19.3) 34.7 (17.8) 
2004 (national poll) 36.6 (16.4) 42.2 (13.5) 
2007 (regional poll) 30.1 (19.4) 34.9 (16.8) 
2008 (national poll) 37.7 (15.9) 44.2 (11.4) 
2011 (regional poll) 32.6 (19.7) 30.5 (15.9) 
2011 (national poll) 43.0 (16.7) 30.2 (11.3) 
Source: Own elaboration. Standard deviation is given in parentheses. 
 
                                                 
8 However, we have to take into account, as already, that this author analyses only simultaneous voting, which 
does not occur in the voting we have considered in this study. 
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At the beginning of the 21st century, Spain experienced the onset of an important 
increase in all macroeconomic indicators, which can be summarized in the change 
in the gross domestic product per capita: this increased by 18.1% in 8 years.9 At 
the same time, political corruption also exploded, mainly at the local level. 
In fact, while there was no case of anyone being accused of local corruption in 
2000 in Spain (at least we have not found it), after that the number increased 
exponentially to more than 200 cases in 2011. In the nationalization process 
described above, two main parties in Spain also have the main share in the number 
of local corruption cases: more than 80% in all periods. Table 2 summarizes the 
distribution by political party and electoral period considered.  
It should be noted that we only take into account corruption cases under judicial 
investigation and these cases not only refer to the mayor but to any other person 
directly related to the party considered. The database has been own-elaborated10 
 
Table 2 Number of local corruption cases by political party and electoral period 
 PP PSOE 
Other 
parties 
Total cases in the 
electoral period 
1999-2004 4 (40) 3 (30) 3 (30) 10 
2005-2008 27 (46.6) 17 (29.3) 14 (24.1) 58 
2009-2011 63 (43.4) 58 (40) 24 (16.6) 145 
Total 94 (44.1) 78 (36.6) 41 (19.3) 213 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Note: The corruption share in the period is given in parentheses. 
 
Thus, while national parties treat to consolidate local results as a means of 
increasing their vertical integration in Spain (i.e. being present at all levels of the 
quasi-federal country), their local candidates impede this process. But is this 
                                                 
9 This was USD 13,836,70 in 1999 and reached USD 16,351,11 in 2007 (in constant dollars of 2000). Source: 
World Bank Database. 
10 We use database constructed and explained in Jiménez and García (2012). 
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impediment so important? How much do national parties lose through the 
corruption of their local candidates? 
Table 3 shows the average change in national vote share in those municipalities 
where a local corruption case has been occurred. The change has been obtained as 
the rate between votes shares in national elections previous to be imputed and the 
next one. We have divided into PP or PSOE. The rest of cases have not been 
considered due to they belongs to different parties and the most do not participate 
at national elections. 
Average results yield to a paradigmatic conclusion: PSOE is the unique political 
party that reduces votes share, while PP increases its average share. Moreover, the 
limits of confidence interval for PP are positive. 
 
Table 3. Average change in nacional votes share by political party 
 
Cases 
considered 
Average 
change 
Standard 
deviation 
Confidence 
interval (95%) 
PP 92 8.6 1.3 [6, 11.3] 
PSOE 78 -23.8 1.9 [-27.6, -20.1] 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
This evidence has an intuitive interpretation that Figure 1 support: voters do not 
punish all cases equally (as Jiménez and García, 2012, state). The histogram for 
both parties is unbalanced: PP´s histogram shows a more positive change, while 
PSOE´s is a more negative effect on votes. 
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Figure 1. Histogram of change in nacional vote share after corruption case 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
However, the correlations showed in the Table 3 and graphical analysis could have 
other explanations than the local corruption case. For example the possible 
existence of fixed effects, population, among others variables, could affect the 
outcome. Therefore, to find a more robust relationship an econometric approach is 
needed. 
To answer these questions we created a database that includes the following 
variables, all of which are used in the estimations described in the next section: 
(i) Share-PPit: this endogenous variable represents the share of votes of the main 
right-wing party (PP) in the municipality i at electoral year t. We also use the share 
data for previous local elections (four years before) as a lagged variable for its 
explanatory power. This lagged variable allows us to control for historical voting 
behaviour in each municipality. Jiménez and García (2012) or Costas-Pérez et al 
(2012) also use this lagged covariate. 
ii) Change Share-PPit: change between two local elections in the share of votes of 
the main right-wing party (PP) in the municipality i at electoral year t, respect to 
previous local elections. This variable will be an endogenous one in the Difference-
in-differences estimator we explain in the following section, as Costas-Pérez et al 
(2012) do. 
(iii) Share-PSOEit: this endogenous variable represents the share of votes of the 
main left-wing party (PSOE) in the municipality i at electoral year t. We also use 
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the share data for previous local elections (four years before) as a lagged variable 
for its explanatory power. We include it for the reasons mentioned above. 
iv) Change Share-PSOEit: change between two local elections in the share of votes 
of the main left-wing party (PSOE) in the municipality i at electoral year t, respect 
to previous local elections. 
(v) Standing Againit: this is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the accused 
candidate stood for local elections again in the municipality i at year t after being 
imputed. This variable is included to control for whether there is a “candidate 
effect” on voting, i.e. if voters punish not only the party but also the re-election of 
the accused candidate. Costas-Pérez et al (2012), include a similar variable, but 
they take into account whether the party of the mayor is the same in t than in t-1. 
(vi) Corruptionbefore2004it: this is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the 
case of local corruption in the municipality i was brought before 2004 and 0 in all 
other cases. As our main aim is to detect partisan behaviour, we consider 
separately local corruption by PP or PSOE, i.e., it is 1 if a case of local corruption of 
PP has been occurred in the municipality i in this period. This explanation affects 
two following covariates. 
(vii) Corruptionperiod200408it: this is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if 
the case of local corruption in the municipality i was brought between 2004 and 
2008 and 0 if brought in the years t prior to 2004. 
(viii) Corruptionperiod200811it: this binary variable takes the value 1 if the case 
of local corruption in the municipality i was brought between 2008 and 2011 and 0 
in the years t prior to 2008. 
(ix) Density of population(lagged)it-1: this is the density of population of the 
municipality i at year t but lagged one year to show the year before elections. 
Source: La Caixa municipal database. 
(x) Local property tax (IBI)it: this variable refers to the taxable income of the local 
property tax in each municipality for every year of the database. We include it to 
capture the degree of urban development and its value, as state Fernández-
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Vázquez and Rivero (2010). Source: Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones 
Públicas. 
(xi) % of people above 65 years oldit: this covariate is the percentage of the total 
population in the municipality i at year t who are elderly. We include it to control 
for potential different vote or partisan behaviour among municipalities. 
(xii) Bi-annual rate of populationit: this variable is the average of two different 
growth rates, i) the annual variation of population from year t-1 to year t, and ii) 
the annual variation of population from year t-2 to t-1, for every municipality i. 
Costas-Pérez et al (2012) also use it, but they use four-years lagged growth rate. 
(xiii) Gross domestic product per capitait: this comprises GDP per capita at current 
prices for every autonomous community in the corresponding year. It has been 
included to control for potential income effects on vote. Source: Spanish Statistical 
Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística). 
(xiv) Yeari: this is a variable indicating the year; we include it to control for time 
effects in the data pool. 
(xv) Provincei: this is a dummy variable for municipality i in each Province in Spain 
which controls for potential fixed effects. This is an important variable in Spain due 
to the fact that, in some Autonomous Communities, national subjective identity has 
been a key element in the configuration of a particular electoral arena in which 
parties have to structure the demands and aspirations of regional autonomy 
(Rivero, 2011). 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics by municipality. We consider two types of 
municipality: corrupt (C), which are those in which there has been at least one 
allegation of local corruption, and non-corrupt (NC). 
As we can see, the average population in corrupt municipalities is 56,026 
habitants, whereas the average population in non-corrupt areas is 10,187. In 
relation to population density, we observe that this is two times higher (on 
average) in corrupt areas that in non-corrupt ones. As well as having the highest 
density of population, corrupt municipalities present a higher average in relation 
to local property tax. 
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Concerning the age of the population, we note that the percentage of people older 
than 65 is 4.4% greater in non-corrupt areas and the demographic growth is 0.8% 
greater in corrupt places. Despite these differences, we can find no such contrast in 
GDP per capita between the two areas. 
Finally, the shares of votes for the two main parties in each type of municipality are 
remarkable. In corrupt areas the average share of votes for PP is higher than the 
average of votes for PSOE (37% and 28% respectively), while in non-corrupt 
places there is not such a large difference, 33% in the case of PP and 31% for PSOE. 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics by municipality (2004, 2008, 2011) 
Variable 
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
C Non-C C Non-C C Non-C C Non-C 
Population 56026 10187 206345 40397 1014 235 3273049 1619337 
Density of 
population 
752 359 1604 1271 6 1.6 17151 22193 
Local property tax 
(IBI) 
2218801 352740.4 9880644 1693803 6963 1472 1.6e+08 7.5e+07 
% population > 65 15.7 20.1 5.9 7.2 3.5 3.0 38.7 55.8 
Bi-annual rate of 
population 
2.3 1.5 3.1 3.5 -4.9 -22.5 20.8 55.8 
Regional GDP per 
capita  
20416.88 21185.93 4601.63 4670.44 13085 13085 31791 31791 
PP share of votes  0.37 0.33 0.15 0.19 0 0 0.73 0.85 
PSOE share of 
votes  
0.28 0.31 0.13 0.16 0 0 0.76 0.83 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Note: C: Corrupt municipality; Non-C: Non-corrupt municipality. 
 
In the following section, we analyse the influence of corruption on the vote share 
by party. 
4. Estimations and results 
Based on the nationalization effect explained in the previous section, we focus 
solely on the two main political parties in Spain: the main right-wing party (PP), 
and the main left-wing party (PSOE). So the main goal of this paper is to determine 
whether voters punish national parties when local candidates are involved 
judicially in a corruption case, considering separately both main political parties.11 
As in Jiménez and García (2012), we estimate separately a voters’ equation for 
each party. In this way, our empirical approach is to consider local corruption 
cases concerning both parties while disregarding “clean” municipalities (i.e. cities 
where no corruption case exists) at all levels to minimize crossed or punishing 
votes to the opposite party. This will be our control group each year. 
                                                 
11 We have considered the effect on the vote of corruption, regardless of whether the party analyze show the 
absolute majority in the municipality considered. 
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Both voters’ equations are similar for these two national parties (see equations 1 
and 2). We attempt to explain the share of voting for PSOE (equation 1) and for PP 
(equation 2) based on the historical national voting behaviour in the municipality 
(the lagged variable), the binary variables of corruption cases at the local level by 
period, and the binary variable to control for the effects of the decision of the 
accused to stand for re-election, the characteristics of the municipality (density of 
population, proportion of the elderly in the population, property tax), gross 
domestic product per capita by region and fixed effects by province and year.  
We have applied the following empirical strategy: firstly, both equations (PSOE 
and PP vote share equation) have been estimated using OLS with control variables. 
A cluster option by municipality in Stata has been included to control for potential 
heterogeneity among them. We estimate three models, adding municipal 
characteristics at model (2) and the variable “standing again” in model (3). The 
latter control personal effects on vote (i.e., whether voters are punishing not at 
political party but local corrupted politic). 
As in Costas-Pérez et al (2012) state, previous studies on this topic fail to account 
for the omission of popularity shocks. For this reason our second empirical 
strategy is to implement a difference-in-differences estimator (hereafter DiD). 
So, both empirical strategies show the following vote equation for the main left-
wing party in Spain. The first one has “share-PSOE” as its endogenous variable, 
while “change in share-PSOE” is the endogenous in the latter. 
 
Share − PSOEit = β0 + β1Share − PSOEit−1 + β2Corruptionbefore2004 it +
+β3Corruptionperiod2005 − 08it + β4Corruptionperiod2009 −11it + β5Again +
+β6%Pop>65it−1 + β7DensityPopit−1 + β8IBIit−1 + β9GDPpcit−1 + β10Bi-rateit +
+β11Year + βProvincei +
i=12
63
∑ εit
 [1] 
 
Where variables are those defined in previous section. Estimated coefficients for 
equation [1] are included in Table 5 (Models 1 to 3). The DiD equation is Model (4). 
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Table 5. Effects of corruption on the main left-wing party (PSOE) vote share 
(OLS and DiD) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
% PSOE vote share in previous elections 0.794 (0.005)*** 0.781 (0.006)*** 
0.781 
(0.006)*** 
-1.069 
(0.03)*** 
Local corruption before 2004 0.003 (0.007) 0.003 (0.007) 0.007 (0.008) 0.008 (0.04) 
Local corruption [2005-2008] 
-0.0083 
(0.003)** 
-0.009 (0.004)** -0.0059 (0.004) 0.003 (0.02) 
Local corruption [2009-2011] -0.0009 (0.002) -0.0004 (0.002) 8e-5 (0.002) -0.0002 (0.008) 
Standing again   -0.011 (0.006)* -0.046 (0.024)* 
Density of population (lagged)  1e-6 (3e-7)*** 
1e-06 (3e-
07)*** 
4e-6 (1e-6)*** 
Bi-annual rate of population  -0.032 (0.018)* -0.032 (0.017)* 0.045 (0.07) 
Local property tax (IBI)  -1e-10 (1e-10) -1e-10 (1e-10) -5e-10 (3e-10) 
% population > 65  0.045 (0.008)*** 
0.045 
(0.008)*** 
0.182 (0.04)*** 
Regional GPD per capita  1e-5 (9e-7)*** 1e-5 (9e-07)*** 4e-5 (5e-6)*** 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.144 (0.002)*** 
-0.147 
(0.015)*** 
-0.146 
(0.015)*** 
-0.712 
(0.111)*** 
Observations 9167 8942 8942 8941 
R2 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.62 
F-statistic (*) (*) (*) (*) 
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Note 2: (*) Due to the used of both fixed effects by province and cluster by municipality, 
Stata does not report the F-statistic for conjoint significance. 
Note 3: We also estimate all equations using cluster by region, to control data spatial 
autocorrelation. No changes in coefficients were introduced. 
 
The explanatory capacity of the estimated models is quite satisfactory, with an R2 
close to 0.9. The following conclusions can be drawn from our findings. Firstly, the 
main explanatory variable in the voters´ equation is the previous behaviour in the 
municipality. 
However, there is a negative effect on votes for national parties in municipalities 
due to local corruption, but only for cases in the period 2005-2008. This average 
effect is equal to 0.9 (see model 2 in table 5), which means that PSOE’s share of 
national votes in municipalities accused of corruption decreased by 0.9 percentage 
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points compared to their previous share. This result is similar in sign but rather 
lower than estimated by Jiménez and García (2012) for local votes, which shows a 
variation from 2.2 to 3.7 percentage points, depending on which local election we 
consider. 
Another interesting result is that the variable “Standing again” is significant at 10% 
and it shows a negative sign. Its coefficient is 0.011, but the variable of local 
corruption previously mentioned is not significant. This implies that PSOE voters 
punish not only the party (0.9 percentage points) more severely but also an 
accused candidate who tries to be re-elected (1.1 percentage points). This 
coefficient is higher in DiD equation (Model 4, last column). 
With regard to the main right-wing party (PP), the empirical approach taken was 
the same as for PSOE and we estimated a similar equation (number 2): 
Share − PPit = β0 + β1Share − PPit−1 + β2Corruptionbefore2004 it +
+β3Corruptionperiod2005 − 08it + β4Corruptionperiod2009 −11it + β5Again +
+β6%Pop>65it−1 + β7DensityPopit−1 + β8IBIit−1 + β9GDPpcit−1 + β10Bi-rateit +
+β11Year + βProvincei +
i=12
63
∑ εit
 [2] 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the estimation. 
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Table 6. Effects of corruption on the main right-wing party (PP) vote share (OLS and DiD) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
% PP vote share in previous elections 0.83 (0.007)*** 
0.836 
(0.007)*** 
0.836 
(0.007)*** 
-0.434 
(0.057)*** 
Local corruption before 2004 -0.009 (0.007) -0.010 (0.007) -0.010 (0.007) -0.023 (0.016) 
Local corruption [2005-2008] 0.0072 (0.003)** 
0.0075 
(0.003)** 
0.0073 
(0.003)** 
0.025 (0.01)** 
Local corruption [2009-2011] -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.006) 
Standing again   0.0009 (0.006) -0.037 (0.01)** 
Density of population (lagged)  8e-8 (2e-7) 8e-8 (2e-7) 1e-6 (9e-7) 
Bi-annual rate of population  0.056 (0.022)** 
0.056 
(0.021)** 
0.133 
(0.051)** 
Local property tax (IBI)  -2e-11 (7e-11) -2e-11 (7e-11) -8e-11 (2e-10) 
% population > 65  0.006 (0.009) 0.006 (0.009) -0.04 (0.03) 
Regional GPD per capita  -5e-7 (7e-7) -5e-7 (7e-7) 1e-5 (4e-6)** 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.13 (0.004)*** 
0.038 
(0.014)*** 
0.038 
(0.013)*** 
-0.114 (0.09) 
Observations 8153 7936 7936 7935 
R2 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.44 
F-statistic (*) (*) (*) (*) 
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Note 2: (*) Due to the used of both fixed effects by region and cluster by municipality, Stata 
does not report the F-statistic for conjoint significance. 
Note 3: We also estimate all equations using cluster by region, to control data spatial 
autocorrelation. No changes in coefficients were introduced. 
 
 
In these estimations, the explanatory capacity is also satisfactory, with a high R2. 
Nevertheless, in this case, although the results are quite similar, the most relevant 
fact is that not only did vote share not decrease, but that it actually increased after 
a case of local corruption. This increase amounted to 0.75 percentage points after a 
local corruption case in those municipalities that were accused in the period 2005-
2008 (see model 2 in Table 6). 
Jiménez and García (2012) also found this positive result for PP after a corruption 
case, which obtained a positive reaction from voters of close to 4 percentage 
points. Unlike the previous case, the candidate was not a significant covariate in 
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the estimation. This means that PP voters did not consider the personal actions of 
the candidate but of the party. 
Winter and Weitz-Shapiro (2010) put forward two main possible explanations as 
to why voters support corrupt politicians (as in the case of PP): the information 
hypothesis and the trade-off hypothesis. The former suggests that voters support 
corrupt politicians when they lack information about a candidate’s involvement in 
corruption upon which they could then act in the voting booth. The latter is 
understood by voters in the following way: they expect that the benefits from a 
politician’s actions in government will be greater than the costs associated with 
corruption. 
However, as Jiménez and García (2012) state, PP’s and PSOE’s local corruption 
cases do not differ substantially from each other, nor are there differences in the 
structural characteristics or singular behaviour between municipalities. Thus, 
these authors think that a “loyalty hypothesis” applied in this case. It is common 
knowledge that Spanish right-wing voters are more loyal and faithful than left-
wing voters. Moreover, the cornerstone of this phenomenon is probably the 
peripheral voters, who are more aligned with left-wing parties and, after a 
corruption case, they change their votes (see DeNardo, 1980; DeNardo, 1986; 
Grofman et al, 1999 or Lago and Montero, 2010). 
Finally, although the number of corruption cases faced by the two parties is quite 
similar, the main right-wing party in Spain has objected in recent years to 
judgments concerning local corruption in municipalities governed by PP. PP’s 
voters may therefore use this fact as an argument for party loyalty. 
5. Conclusions 
Elections are the unique moment in which voters can punish corrupt politicians. 
However, the expected negative effect on voting behaviour after a corruption case 
shows some sensitivity due to the fact that voters not only consider candidates´ 
individual skills but also the party in which they are running for election, and that 
citizens are not consistent in their voting patterns in different levels of elections. 
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The process of decentralization that began in Spain after 1978 heralded a new 
increasing role for local and regional governments in budgetary concerns. Added 
to this, at the time of the “marvellous” economic boom in Spain in the 2000s, there 
was a simultaneous boom in local cases of corruption. Although some recent 
papers have analysed this, none has addressed whether local corruption reduces 
the importance of national parties in the local arena. 
To examine this question, we have elaborated a Spanish municipality database that 
includes local indicators, polling results on local and national elections and data on 
local corruption cases, in the period 1999-2011. Descriptive analysis shows that 
the two-party system (i.e. PSOE and PP, the two main national parties) increased 
its share from 1987 to 2007, together attaining 70.5% of the votes. Moreover, 
comparing the results in national polls with those in the immediately preceding 
regional polls reveals that the two main national parties did not win the race at the 
regional level, i.e. they were vote losers in the regional calls. 
We estimated two national vote equations by municipality, one for the main right-
wing party and one for the main left-wing party, using as explanatory variables the 
previous vote share of the party, the characteristics of the municipality, fixed and 
temporal effects and a binary variable to control for corrupt municipalities and 
candidates who stood again. 
Our results show two main effects: the first is that voters react softly to local 
corruption in national parties when they vote for these parties in national 
elections. In fact, while previous studies have found that corrupt parties lost close 
to 4 percentage points of their vote share (or more, depending on the database 
used), this study quantifies it at less than 1%. 
However, the second effect is the most “curious”: while PSOE’s vote share 
decreased by 0.8 percentage points after a corruption case, PP´s vote share, rather 
than decreasing, actually increased by 0.7 percentage points. This result is 
confirmed in a similar analysis done by Jiménez and García (2012), and leads to the 
positing of a “loyalty hypothesis”. This fits with the well-known fact that Spanish 
right-wing voters are more loyal and faithful than left-wing voters. 
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As a result, we can conclude that a trade-off between local corruption and national 
votes exists, but it depends on who is accused. Based on data concerning national 
parties at the local level, although the reduction in votes is not especially high, it 
should be taken into account by national parties. 
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